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Religious Law Schools:
Tension Between Conscience
and Academic Freedom
Kent Greenawalt
My comments this afternoon are responsive to John Garvey’s Presidential
Address on Institutional Pluralism at last year’s meeting. The gist of his
address, delivered gracefully, undogmatically, and persuasively, is that it may
be desirable to have law schools that are devoted substantially to particular
endeavors and points of view. Dean Garvey mentioned law schools that
concentrate on teaching particular subjects, such as law and economics, or
training for geographical areas, such as northern New York, or preparing
for forms of practice, such as clinical work, or helping a particular group of
potential lawyers, such as African‑Americans, or reflecting a special point
of view about a person’s place in the world and its relation to law and legal
practice, such as law schools with a substantial religious perspective.
I should like to draw attention to what is a nuance of difference, if not an
outright distinction, between this last group of law schools and the others,
one that both affects how we as members of the AALS should view arguments
in their favor but also heightens the possible tension between a school’s
aspirations and the liberty of individual faculty members.
Dean Garvey treats the topic in terms of a balance of advantages, what
diversity among law schools can contribute to the entire law school community
and legal profession. No one doubts that law students as a group should be
exposed to diverse perspectives and opportunities. Crudely stated, the issue
is whether it is best to count on diversity within each of the schools, and in
the communities and culture outside of law schools, or to encourage diversity
fostered by individual law schools taking special directions. One might
think, although Garvey does not, that given diversity in the broad culture,
in undergraduate education, and within law schools of any substantial size,
we have no need for schools setting out on their own focused missions, that
is, focused on something other than providing the best possible broad legal
education.
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The question Dean Garvey addresses is about overall good, analyzed
without any presupposition about the truth of any particular religious or
political viewpoint. But an organization like ours must also consider another
perspective. What should be the response if individuals strongly believe
they should undertake one form or another of special educational focus?
An individual, or most members of an organization, might conclude that,
on balance, some form of diverse education is actually undesirable, but that
individuals should not be denied the opportunity to engage in that education
if they feel strongly about it. The question would then arise what concessions
from ordinary standards, if any, should be made so that those who wish can
further such education.
I want to be clear that by approaching the subject from this perspective,
I do not mean to indicate skepticism about the value of schools with special
missions. In my own work over the years, I have benefitted greatly from contacts
with law schools in the Roman Catholic tradition. The reason I approach the
topic from the perspective of conscience is probably a consequence of my
longstanding interest in religious liberty.
If we focus on a law school that would concentrate heavily on clinical
education, or law and economics, we probably would conclude that, if
students are forewarned about the school’s emphasis and the school provides
a sufficiently broad education so that students who discover that their interests
or career opportunities lie elsewhere will have been adequately prepared, those
who want to create such a school should be free to do so. It would follow that
in initial hiring decisions, such schools should be able to give weight to interest
in the subjects they wish to emphasize. What of tenured faculty already at
the school, or faculty whose interests shift after they receive tenure? So long
as these faculty members perform the teaching responsibilities to which they
are assigned, I do not think they should lose their positions because they no
longer are an ideal fit with the school’s overall aspirations.
When it comes to aiding particular groups of the population, the AALS
should consider whether the aid counters pervasive discrimination or helps
perpetuate it. It would, for example, appropriately refuse to sanction a law
school devoted to assisting white students to the exclusion of law students of
color.
Schools that wish to convey and embody a religious or other ideological
message are special both because they touch especially strongly on basic
issues of conscience and can generate decisions about hiring and firing that
contravene what we take as basic standards for most purposes.
I shall pass over one conceivable argument in favor of schools devoted to
particular religious perspectives, namely that most leading law schools are so
dominantly secular, with faculty members who by and large have little interest
in religion, that religious law schools are needed to redress the balance. It
may be that religious perspectives of various sorts would get swallowed up if
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distributed evenly across law schools, but one could not reach that conclusion
without some complicated empirical assumptions.
Many who wish to participate in a law school that concentrates on clinical
education or opportunities for African Americans may feel that doing so is a
matter of social conviction or conscience. In the same way, I believe that for
those who wish to organize and to participate in law schools with a religious
perspective, the endeavor is likely to be a matter of conscience or conviction.
Law school education is one forum for communicating religious values
they deeply believe in. For the rest of us, not feeling drawn to participate in
such an endeavor, the question is not only what is desirable overall, or even
whether to yield to a reasonable individual choice about what to do, but also
whether to make an accommodation to conscience. We might think of the
option of a genuinely religious law school as not unlike the kind of issue of
accommodation that arises under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. I
am not sure how many of the creators and faculty of religious law schools
consider their involvement to be a matter of religious conscience, or at least
strong conviction, but the number is not small.
If one conceives of both universities and religious institutions as “separate
spheres” each of which should be granted considerable autonomy by the
state, an analogous question arises at the institutional level: how far should a
body representing the broad principles of justice for law schools, such as the
Association of American Law Schools, seek to accommodate the autonomy
of individual law schools conceived as both religious and devoted to legal
education? If we view this particular claim of diversity from the vantage
point of accommodation, the claim in its favor seems particularly strong,
independent of one’s evaluation of the net benefit to the legal community of
having law schools with this special focus.
But with this strength comes a cost that does not exist for law schools that
illustrate other forms of diversity. To create such a school requires selecting
faculty members on the basis of their religious affiliation or at least their
sympathy with the chosen religious endeavor. Yet selection for employment
that discriminates by religion violates one of our fundamental norms of
equality.1
How serious a concern is this? Were there so many religious law schools of
a particular type that job opportunities were extremely scarce for nonbelievers
or members of different faiths, the concern would be very great. By contrast,
were there outright, though unacknowledged, discrimination against seriously
religious individuals at most law schools, occasional selectivity in favor of
believers might redress an imbalance. I think the truth lies somewhere between
these ends of the spectrum. I am unaware of any pervasive disadvantage in
the teaching market for religious believers, although I think that outspoken
defense of certain positions that are highly unpopular among most law school
1.

See Bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools, Inc. § 6‑3 (2008), available at http://
www.aals.org/about_handbook_bylaws.php.
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faculty and are commonly based on religious premises may well be a handicap.
Relatively few law schools are strongly religious in the sense of wanting a
particular affiliation or commitment from their faculty members. If those law
schools do freely select on the grounds they like, that does not significantly
affect (if it affects at all) overall job opportunities in law teaching. Such selection
undoubtedly influences the distribution of opportunities. A non‑Mormon has
less opportunity to teach at Brigham Young than he or she would if Brigham
Young were indifferent to religious affiliation. But the opportunity to teach at
another law school may be marginally enhanced because an able Mormon has
been drawn to Brigham Young.
I am not sure whether anyone has made a careful study of how many law
schools do use religious criteria to choose faculty members and what the likely
effect is on job opportunities overall, but such a study might influence how
one views this issue.
Religious criteria may influence faculty at three career stages: initial hiring,
the grant of tenure, and decisions about employment once tenure is granted.
My present inclination about religion and faculty employment is toward these
positions. Seriously religious law schools should be able to consider not only
sympathy with their religious endeavor but also actual religious convictions
and affiliations in initial hiring, and it should be possible for them to acquire
the information necessary to make such choices.2 To obtain this privilege,
perhaps a school should have to present to the AALS a statement outlining its
sense of mission and why it needs particular information to fulfill that mission.
Thus, if it were enough for a Roman Catholic school that an applicant be
sympathetic to its mission, whether or not a Roman Catholic, the school might
not be allowed to inquire about actual denominational membership.
At the tenure stage, I think a school should be able to judge a faculty
member’s fit with its mission, based on his or her teaching and scholarship.
Probably at this point the school should have to rely on what the teacher has
actually done, without further inquiry into personal beliefs, attitudes, and
affiliations.
Once a faculty member is awarded tenure, my sense is that the balance
should shift. If he or she is teaching competently and doing the (minimal)
amount of scholarship that may be required, the school should then take the
risk about fit with mission. That is, those in authority should not be able to
terminate a professor’s employment based on a determination that he has
drifted too far from the ideals of the school. Perhaps, however, a school that
sets highly specific standards of behavior or affiliation and makes these a clear
condition of continued employment should be able to dismiss a professor
who definitely violates such standards. With this possible exception, I think
2.

But see Association of American Law Schools, Inc., Executive Committee Regulations §
6‑3.1 (2005), available at http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_regulations/php (allowing
law schools with “religious affiliation or purpose to adopt preferential admissions and
employment practices that directly relate to the school’s religious affiliation or purpose”).
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judgments about faculty members based on fit with religious aspirations should
end with the award of tenure. Part of my reason is that a school with a strong
religious outlook should be able to cope with a limited number of faculty who
may have drifted toward heretical beliefs and attitudes after acquiring tenure.
At present, my sense is not only that the schools should adopt the attitude
I’ve suggested, but that the AALS should insist on it, with the sanctions that
Article 7 of the Bylaws provides standing in the wings. This may be the present
understanding. Section 4.3 of the Executive Regulations adopts the following
Interpretive Comments issued in 1970 in regard to the American Association
of University Professors’ 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure:
“Most church‑related institutions no longer need or desire the departure from
the principles of academic freedom implied in the 1940 Statement, and we
do not now endorse such a departure.”3 Firing a tenured professor because
of a change in his or her religious views would be a departure. If “we do not
endorse” also includes “we do not accept,” dismissal would be a violation of
the Association’s standard of academic freedom.
In conclusion, apart from their value overall, the presence of law schools
with a strong religious mission presents a significant issue of accommodation
to religious conscience and a complicated question of the consequences for
permissible standards of faculty employment.

3.

Id. at § 4.3 (quoting American Association of University Professors, Policy Documents and
Reports, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure 3 (AAUP Press,
Washington, D.C., 10th ed., 2006)).

